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The Behavioral Economics of Multilevel 
Marketing 
 
Heidi Liu* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Multilevel marketing companies (MLMs) — sales organizations that 
compensate independent consultants based on the sales and recruitment of 
other consultants — form a significant part of the American economy.  Yet, 
MLMs provide little information to regulators and potential participants 
regarding potentially material information.  Although MLMs are often 
compared to pyramid schemes, consultants argue that participation in a 
MLM allows them to make money outside of the traditional full-time labor 
force.  This paper examines the law, economics, and psychology of MLMs, 
suggesting that MLMs may draw on prospective consultants’ cognitive 
biases in persuading consultants to join and continue a MLM.  Consultants 
may be led to focus on unlikely benefits and to conform to notions of success 
that seem consistent with the “American dream” — even to their financial 
loss.  
 
  
 
 * Ph.D. Student, Harvard University (Public Policy); J.D. 2017, Harvard Law School; A.B. 2011, 
Harvard College (Economics).  Many thanks to Professor Oren Bar-Gill for his valuable comments.  
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Upon entering the homepage of American Communication Network, 
LLC (better known as ACN), you are greeted with one sentence: “Stop 
waiting for life to happen and create it — with ACN!”1  You have three 
options to proceed: 
1. A large arrow that says “Start Today” 
2. The phrase “Learn More” at the bottom of the page 
3. In small, nearly transparent letters, the word “Scroll” (i.e., scroll 
down)2 
Clicking “Start Today” takes you immediately to a “convenient online 
form” with a $499 application fee:  A lengthy “ACN Independent Business 
Owner Agreement,” that is signed with the last four digits of your Social 
Security Number — without having provided your name.3  On the other 
hand, clicking the “Learn More” button leads you to a contact form with the 
caveat that “if you first heard about ACN from an Independent Business 
Owner, contact that person for more information.”4  
Choosing to scroll down leads you to a segment that asks: “What if you 
got paid every time someone talked on the phone, watched television, sent 
text messages, surfed the internet, swiped a credit card, or used natural gas 
or electricity?  ACN’s home-based business provides an opportunity to earn 
income on the services people are already using every day.”5 
Finally, scrolling down further, you find a caption for a charity logo that 
states: “Every time someone becomes an ACN customer, a child gets fed”6 
and another quote from an ACN consultant: “I try never to think of what I 
will do next week or next month, but always today.  That has always helped 
me get closer to my long-term goals.”7  Alongside these quotes are links to 
other parts of the website — but no search function to find other information 
about the company.8 
It took approximately twenty minutes exploring the website for this 
author to find a list of the services ACN provides.9  These services include 
telecommunications, home security, and energy utilities — a fairly broad 
 
 1. ACN, http://www.acninc.com [https://perma.cc/W4BQ-EDEY]. 
 2. ACN, supra note 1. 
 3. ACN Independent Business Owner Agreement, ACN, https://myacn2.acninc.com/On 
LineRepAgreem-ent/RepAgrmStart.do?init=false [https://perma.cc/73H3-YHU9]. 
 4. ACN Contact Form, ACN, http://acnreview.com/leads/?CO_LA=US_EN [https://perma. 
cc/VUC9-FNMX].  
 5. ACN, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id.  
 9. See ACN, https://www.myacn.com/ [https://perma.cc/4GEJ-JL2S]. 
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portfolio.10  It took another few minutes to find how Independent Business 
Owners earn money, as the Compensation Plan is only accessible within the 
Agreements.  As an ACN Independent Business Owner — not a salesperson 
— you receive a portion of sales from customers.  If an Owner recruits others 
to become Owners, he receives a portion of their sales from customers.  The 
more customers Owners and their recruits have, the higher percentage of 
commissions you earn.11  
ACN, with revenues of $800 million in 2016,12 is just one example of a 
multilevel marketing company (called a “MLM”):  A company that not only 
markets goods and services through direct sales, but also incentivizes its 
consultants to recruit other potential consultants.13  In a MLM, consultants 
are considered non-employees of the company,14 and the incentives may be 
aligned in such a way that it may be more profitable for consultants to recruit 
others than to sell products.15  In contrast, traditional salespeople are 
employed by companies and are paid a combination of a base salary and 
bonuses, based on how much inventory they or their team are able to sell.16  
Perhaps it is for this reason that the websites of ACN and other prominent 
MLMs17 provide a similar emphasis on the opportunity to become a 
consultant rather than the products themselves.18  
 
 10. See id.  
 11. North American Compensation Plan Overview, ACN, http://www2.acninc.com/join/301.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FQB7-N2UT]. 
 12. ACN, Inc. Ranked Among the Largest Direct Selling Companies in the World for 8th Straight 
Consecutive Year, ACN, http://acninc.com/news/press-releases/2016/04/28/acn-ranked-among-largest-
direct-sellers [https://perma.cc/X6ES-NCJU]. 
 13. Participants involved with MLM companies may go by a variety of names — consultants, 
distributors, owners, or contractors.  In this paper, I use the term consultants to refer to any participant.  
See Wesley K. Dagestad, Note, Day’s Pyramid Ignores Sturdy Severability Foundation, Builds off 
Granite Rock, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 349 n.2 (2014). 
 14. See Joel Busher, Sophie Bremner, and Paramita Muljono, Freedom, Family, Hope and 
Rewards? Points of Departure for Development Studies Research on Direct Selling (U. Anglia Sch. Int’l 
Dev., Working Paper No. 16, 2009).   
 15. See ACN, supra note 11.  Consultants are paid a higher percentage of sales the more customer 
points they have.  Customer points are based on the number of customers and recruits a consultant has.  
If you assume that a recruit has at least one customer, then it is in the consultant’s interest to recruit rather 
than to sell to a customer.  
 16. See, e.g., Thomas Steenburgh and Michael Ahearne, Motivating Sales People: What Really 
Works, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/07/motivating-salespeople-what-really-
works [https://perma.cc/R2CU-7N2L]. 
 17. Compare ACN, supra note 1, with, e.g., AMWAY, http://www.amway.com/ [https:// 
perma.cc/APH5-5ZLN], and LULAROE, http://www.lularoe.com/ [https://perma.cc/YV6G-X755]. 
 18. See, e.g., AMWAY, supra note 17 (where the first front page states “Build your knowledge, build 
your business”), SCENTSY, http://www.scentsy.com [https://perma.cc/PP7R-46SZ] (where a prominent 
arrow points to a consultant application). 
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As much as MLMs sell items (or people), they are also selling a distant 
opportunity.  The majority of MLM consultants are likely to lose money 
from their participation.  There is little public data regarding the MLM 
industry19 — much less MLM’s per capita revenues — aside from what is 
disclosed in litigation.20  However, 87.5% of Herbalife consultants earned a 
median annual income of $637,21 and of all sellers that made any profit, 
median earnings in addition to retail profits, if any, were $245 for the year.22  
There appears to be no data regarding the share of income from recruitment 
(directly or indirectly), compared to sales;23 however, in a 2013 appeal, the 
FTC argued that an emphasis on recruitment led to a net loss for 94% of 
consultants in one company.24  Consultants’ earnings are garnished by 
various expenses, further depreciating their income.  In addition to pursuing 
prospective consultants, consultants often must purchase a training kit 
(which, in some cases, could run up to $50025).  After training, they are 
expected to purchase ongoing promotional items (e.g., catalogs and display 
kits) or pay a subscription fee for their participation.26  A back-of-the-
envelope subtraction of these costs from the little revenue data we have 
suggests that a substantial number of consultants have a net loss.  
 
 19. See William W. Keep and Peter J. Vander Nat, Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in 
the U.S.: An Historical Analysis, 6 J. HIST. RES. IN MARKETING 188, 203 (2014); Sergio Pareja, Sales 
Gone Wild: Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put an End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 
MCGEORGE L.REV. 85, 96 (2008).  
 20. See Keep, supra note 19, at 2034–55. 
 21. Melanie Hicken, The Money Behind Herbalife, Mary Kay, and Others, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013, 
1:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/pf/multilevel-marketing-industry/ [https://perma.cc/6RZJ-
QF2W]. 
 22. What Should I Know About Herbalife Membership?, HERBALIFE, http://www.herbal 
ife.com/Conten-t/en-US/pdf/business-opportunity/statement-of-average-gross-compensation-usen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FXR-4Y6D]. 
 23. Data comparing recruitment income to sales income would be useful information to have, as a 
large share of revenue from recruitment would help to distinguish MLMs from other sales opportunities. 
 24. Second Cross-Appeal and Answering Brief at 30–31, FTC v. Burnlounge, 753 F.3d 878 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-55926, 12-56197, 12-56288 (consolidated)). 
 25. If the MLMs had a training kit over $500, it would need to comply with the FTC’s Franchise 
Rule.  See Pareja, supra note 19, at 92.  In my research, all kits were below $500.  Herbalife’s kit was 
$59.99. 
 26. See also Jayne O’Donnell, Multilevel Marketing or ‘Pyramid’? Sales People Find it Hard to 
Earn Much, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 2011, 8:48 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/ 
reta-il/2011-02-07-multilevelmarketing03_CV_N.htm/ [https://perma.cc/SP7X-LYNY].  I was unable to 
determine how much Herbalife promotional items would cost without signing up (it may vary across 
area).  However, another MLM charges $14.95 monthly for their subscription fee.  See THIRTY-ONE 
GIFTS, https://www.mythirtyone.com/info/join [https://perma.cc/NZ5P-YEL7].  See part III infra for an 
extended discussion on this issue.  
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Indeed, accusations abound online that both prominent27 and obscure28 
MLMs are scams;29 both the FTC30 and various states31 post collections of 
Frequently Asked Questions (FQAs) meant to help people discern if a MLM 
they are considering is worthwhile.  Specifically, MLMs are compared to 
pyramid schemes given similarities in organizational structure (i.e., the 
incentive to recruit new people means that only a few people will make large 
profits).  While not all MLM schemes are illegal pyramid schemes and vice 
versa, both MLMs and pyramid schemes may draw from the literature on 
influence in recruiting consultants that may override a rational actor’s 
decision to participate. 
Behavioral economics presents a potential explanation for why people 
might choose to enter a MLM despite the lack of information from both the 
industry and individual companies.  This interdisciplinary approach drawing 
from law, psychology, and economics has been applied to a variety of 
domains32 and has a close relationship with advertising itself — as both of 
these fields draw inspiration from one another.33  This paper seeks to 
examine the behavioral economics of multilevel marketing companies 
(“MLMs”).  Part I serves as a brief overview of the structure and potential 
enforcement of these companies.  Part II considers under what conditions a 
rational consumer might choose to participate in a MLM.  Part III delineates 
how behavioral biases might cause someone to participate in a MLM in the 
face of incomplete information, drawing from examples from ACN, one of 
the largest MLMs by revenue,34 as well as others.  In particular, I suggest 
 
 27. See Roger Parloff, Herbalife Deal Poses Challenges For the Industry, FORTUNE MAG. (July 
19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/19/herbalife-deal-challenges-industry/ [https://perma.cc/H7L5-
TQYX]. 
 28. See Reddit: MLM Scams, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/mlmscams/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EE7M-BC2K]. 
 29. See infra, Part III. 
 30. See FTC, Multilevel Marketing (July 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/multilevel-marketing [https://perma.cc/Z3PW-BQJ7]. 
 31. See, e.g., Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Consumer Alert: Multi-Level Marketing or Illegal 
Pyramid Scheme?, STATE OF MICHIGAN, http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-17337_20942-
208400--,00.html [https://perma.cc/PS5W-G9ZA]. 
 32. See, e.g., RICHARD THALER AND CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press 2008); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY 
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).  
While NUDGE covers over ten different fields (including, e.g., health, environment, and financial 
markets), the ideas expressed in the book catalyzed innovation all over. 
 33. See, e.g., Matt Carmichael, Making the Most of Our Irrationality, ADVERTISING AGE (Sept. 21, 
2010), http://adage.com/article/adagestat/advertising-dan-ariely-behavioral-economics-marketing/14600 
1/ [https://perma.cc/5JGJ-KMV9].  
 34. 2016 DSN North America 50 List, DIRECT SELLING NEWS (June 1, 2016), http://direct 
sellingnews.c-om/index.php/view/2016_dsn_north_america_50_list1 [https://perma.cc/9KT3-4C6H]. 
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that MLMs engage in both incomplete disclosure about expected economic 
benefits, while simultaneously deemphasizing the importance of economic 
benefits relative to a set of values that they believe consultants should 
develop.  Both of these techniques rely on and exacerbate consultants’ 
behavioral biases.  Finally, Part IV concludes by considering existing 
regulatory policies and further areas of study. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  DEFINING MLMS 
 
Multilevel marketing companies (“MLMs”) are defined as a subset of 
direct-sales companies.35  The multilevel reference in the acronym comes 
from the fact that consultants proceed up levels associated with increased 
commissions as they acquire more customers and recruit more consultants.36  
MLMs sell a variety of goods and services, from health and beauty 
products,37 to clothing,38 and financial39 services, with “an estimated $34.47 
billion in retail sales, and . . . 18.2 million direct selling distributors, in the 
U.S. in 2014.”40  The vast majority of distributors appear to be part-time41 
and female.42   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35. Direct-sell companies are companies that directly sell products and services to the end-user 
without a retailer. See Peter J. Vander Nat and William W. Keep, Marketing Fraud: An Approach for 
Differentiating Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. PUB POL’Y & MARKETING 139, 140 
(2002). 
 36. See ibid. 
 37. See, e.g., AMWAY, supra note 17; HERBALIFE, http://www.herbalife.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
M2TH-LLEC], RODAN + FIELDS, http://www.rodanandfields.com [https://perma.cc/YG5R-RTW8]. 
 38. See, e.g., LULAROE, supra note 17; CABI, http://www.cabiclothing.com [https://perma.cc 
/9H7X-V3R4]. 
 39. See, e.g., PRIMERICA, http://www.primerica.com [https://perma.cc/N5KA-UMCL]. 
 40. Anne T. Coughlan, Multi-Level Marketing Business Opportunities: Analyzing Net Economic 
Return and Avoidable Economic Loss to Distributors, 1 (July 15, 2016) (citing statistics from the Direct 
Sales Association’s defunct link), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822402 [https://perma.cc/UK69-LSSS]. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. “Some 75% of U.S. MLM distributors in 2014 were women, and almost 90 percent worked 
only part-time on their businesses.”  Id. at 1.  Indeed, the MLM industry appears consistently three-
quarters feminine, based on earlier statistics.  See John Bone, “The Longest Day”: “Flexible” Contracts, 
Performance-related Pay and Risk Shifting in the UK Direct Selling Sector, 20 WORK, EMPLOYMENT 
AND SOCIETY 109, 111 (2006) (citing Nicole Woolsey Biggart, CHARISMATIC CAPITALISM (1989)). 
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B.  COMPARISON TO PYRAMID SCHEMES 
 
MLMs and pyramid schemes partially overlap: Some MLM companies 
are pyramid schemes and some pyramid schemes consist of MLM 
companies.  The resemblance between the two is made salient by the 
organizational structure: Pyramid schemes ask those individuals at the base 
of the pyramid to contribute to the higher levels, with the promise of a reward 
provided entirely from those levels below the individual.  Similarly, MLMs 
offer the promise of profits to its consultants, but those profits stem from two 
streams: Commissions from direct sales and commissions from recruiting 
new clients.  Indeed, one early article attempting to distinguish pyramid 
schemes from MLM models pointed out that “the investor's pecuniary 
benefit [of a pyramid scheme] derives primarily from his success in inducing 
additional persons to participate in the plan.”43  
 
C. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND MLMS. 
 
Enforcement against MLMs with problematic business tactics is 
primarily triggered through allegations that the MLMs employ pyramid sales 
schemes.  Prosecution methods crosscut agencies (e.g., Department of 
Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission) 
and approaches.  Overlaid on this framework are potential state law liabilities 
under each state’s lottery and consumer fraud acts.44  The following is a 
general overview of three prosecution approaches categorized as (1) the 
lottery approach, pursued by the DOJ, (2) the securities approach, pursued 
by the SEC and state enforcement bodies, and (3) an assortment of 
consumer-directed approaches pursued by the FTC. 
First, under the lottery approach, spearheaded by the DOJ, the 
investigation centers on three elements:  Consideration, prize, and chance — 
that is, whether the victim has given funds to the company, how much the 
company benefits, and how much the victim may benefit from his or her 
consideration.45  Historically, chance has been the most difficult element to 
 
 43. Donald Daniels, Note, Toward a Uniform Approach to Multilevel Distributorships, 8 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 546, 547 (1975). 
 44. See id. at 559.  As of 2010, more than half of states have enacted laws specifically targeting 
MLMs.  See Adam Epstein, Multi-Level Marketing and its Brethren: The Legal and Regulatory 
Environment in the Down Economy, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 91, 93 (2010).  See also Keith Kanouse, Business 
Opportunity Rule Means Less Disclosure, but by More Companies, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 125, 130 (2007). 
 45. See Daniels, supra note 43, at 552.  
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prove.46  Another DOJ-driven approach includes prosecution under mail 
order fraud, although this strategy is less frequent.47 
Second, the securities approach utilizes federal and state securities laws 
that are violated when an MLM makes materially false or misleading 
statements in connection with a security — an infringing MLM is said to 
have sold a security in the form of an investment contract to its consultants.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission investigates MLMs by pursuing 
fraud claims under the Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, and its 
associated regulations.48  These claims depend on whether the scheme is 
construed to be a security (i.e., the customer “is not required to make 
significant efforts in the operation of the franchise in order to obtain the 
promised return.”49)  The four-prong test derived from SEC v. W.J. Howey 
delineates the Supreme Court’s definition of a security: When an individual 
“(1) invests his money (2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect 
profits (4) solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party.”50  With 
regard to alleged pyramid schemes, the fourth prong is most relevant51 and, 
under SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, the scheme’s profits must not 
substantially — rather than solely, as articulated in Howey — rely on 
recruitment.52  
Some states use a “risk capital test” to determine whether a MLM sells 
a security under state securities laws.53  In such states, the four-prong test 
operates as follows:  
 
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a 
portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the 
enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced 
by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a 
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, 
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a 
result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does 
 
 46. See ibid. (citing generally Zebelman v. United States, 339 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1964)). 
 47. Id. at 553. 
 48. Id. at 554. 
 49. Id. (citing SEC, Securities Act Release No. 5211 (1971); SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 9387 (1971)). 
 50. Douglas M. Fried, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: Substance Over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 309 (1985) (citing SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 
298–299 (1946)). 
 51. See Pareja, supra note 19 at 99. 
 52. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 481–83 (9th Cir. 1973).  See Daniels, supra 
note 43, at 555; Pareja, supra note 19, at 99–100. 
 53. Pareja, supra note 19, at 100. 
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not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over 
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.54 
 
Ignoring both the Howey test and the “risk capital test,” the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a third, more literal 
approach, holding that any pyramid structure should be construed as a 
security — this third test is known as a pyramid-scheme analysis, looking at 
whether the entity is or is not a pyramid scheme and thus a security.55  
Overall, despite the variations in the state and federal tests, whether 
something is a security is generally interpreted very broadly.56 
Third, the FTC has multiple pathways for enforcement against a MLM 
alleged to be a pyramid scheme.  It may look to the Sherman Act in arguing 
that the distributor and the business essentially act as the same entity.57  
Alternatively, the FTC may challenge an alleged pyramid scheme under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits deceptive acts in commerce.58  In 
the well-known case regarding MLM companies, In re Amway Corp., Inc., 
et al.,59 the FTC ruled that Amway had “avoided the abuses of pyramid 
schemes” by requiring that a consultant must sell 70% of her inventory to 10 
different customers each month in order to receive a performance bonus, and 
providing an opportunity for consultants to sell back inventory to Amway.60  
This trifecta of rules, known as the Amway Safeguards,61 provided a test for 
courts determining whether a MLM company is functionally acting as a 
pyramid scheme.62  In general, it appears that courts are quite deferential to 
this standard.63  More recent cases add two indicia to whether a MLM 
business may be operating a pyramid scheme: Whether it provides “lump-
sum payments for each new recruit”64 and whether it provides “rewards 
based on volume purchased by recruits,” as these are unrelated to product 
 
 54. Ibid. (citing Hawaii v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)). 
 55. See ibid. (citing Webster v. Omnitrition International, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 781–82 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 56. Epstein, supra note 44, at 117. 
 57. Daniels, supra note 43, at 556–557. 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); Daniels, supra note 43, at 557.  
 59. In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979). 
 60. Id. at 668. 
 61. Pareja, supra note 19 at 95. 
 62. See, e.g., Whole Living, Inc. v. Tolman, 344 F. Supp. 2d 739, 745–746 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2004) 
(Judge Ted Stewart). 
 63. Epstein, supra note 44, at 104. 
 64. Keep, supra note 19, at 198 (citing generally FTC et al. v. Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing et al., 
Civil No. 13 CV 578 (N.D. Ill. 2013)). 
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sales,65 such that a consultant’s compensation is largely derived from new 
recruits.66 
Altogether, under Amway and related decisions, a court will balance the 
following factors to determine whether a MLM enterprise is an illegal 
pyramid scheme: 
 
1. Products have “no real world marketplace” and the marketing 
program is a cover for a scam; 
2. Products are sold at inflated prices; 
3. That there is a substantial “buy-in” qualification, also known as 
“inventory loading” or “front-loading,” for the membership; 
4. That there is an initial cash investment over $500; 
5. That members must purchase ancillary products or services to 
remain in the program; 
6. Whether the MLM has an inventory repurchase policy in the event 
that the member leaves the MLM; 
7. That the emphasis is, or has become, more focused on rewards for 
recruiting than selling goods or services; and 
8. Whether there are misrepresentations related to membership 
earnings claims or outright misrepresentations related to potential 
income by the member.67 
 
II.  A (POTENTIALLY) RATIONAL EXPLANATION. 
 
One novel aspect of MLM companies is that the consultant is himself a 
good because his existence is a source of revenue to other consultants, either 
directly, through a recruitment fee, or indirectly, through his sales.  This may 
mean that the incentives for MLMs and higher-status consultants (i.e., those 
who could have recruited others in an unsaturated market) are largely 
misaligned with those of lower-status consultants.  Specifically, the former 
category would receive revenue from the lower-status consultants’ 
recruitment-fee generation as well as through their inventory purchases, and 
it may be possible that the revenue from recruitment fees exceeds customer 
 
 65. See ibid. (citing generally FTC v. Equinox Int’l. Corp., 1999 WL 1425373 (D. Nev. 1999); FTC 
v. Trek Alliance, 81 Fed.Appx. 118 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 66. See id. at 199. 
 67. Epstein, supra note 44, at 105–106 (summarizing Jeffrey A. Babener, FTC v. Equinox — Déjà 
Vu, (1999) http://www.mlmlegal.com/equinox.html [https://perma.cc/5CQZ-N3CG ]).  
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purchases.  As one scholar points out: “[F]or MLM companies, there is no 
cost and, in some cases, failure still generates a profit.”68 
Altogether, a rational actor, i.e., a homo economius,69 that is considering 
the entry into a MLM market would want to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, 
comparing the costs of entry relative to the benefits.  Of course, an 
individual’s utility function differs from those of another, so I examine two 
situations: (a) Where the prospective consultant is only considering 
economic costs and benefits and (b) where the prospect is also incorporating 
certain noneconomic considerations into her decision.  
In the first situation, the prospective consultant would calculate the costs 
of the startup package (e.g., training and inventory) against the anticipated 
benefits of sales.  If the expected sales were greater than the startup package, 
and the sales were greater than her outside option (e.g., salary at another job 
or the value she places on leisure time), then she would enter the MLM.70  
Indeed, if she believed that the training that the MLM offered was non-
company specific industry capital, she might value the training more highly.  
Even if she did not have full information about the MLM, she would need 
information about the risk or uncertainty involved. 
In the second situation, the prospective consultant might enter the MLM 
if she valued certain aspects of the job differently.  For instance, a stay-at-
home mom might welcome the opportunity to stay involved in traditional 
market labor.  In both of these situations, it would be economically rational 
for an individual to decide to enter the MLM.  
As a potential homo-economius consultant weighs her options, she 
would probably value information about the average profits per consultant 
and the trajectory over time.  As one economic model notes, even if a 
consultant is uninformed about how productive she will be (e.g., low vs. high 
productivity), knowing the average performance of a consultant can help her 
to make a calculated risk.71 
 
 68. Brian Bloch, Multilevel Marketing: What’s the Catch?, 13 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 18, 25 
(1996). 
 69. See generally, Richard Thaler, From Homo Economius to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 
133–141 (2000), for an example of this term in a behavioral economics context. 
 70. See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 12. It might also be possible that a distributor derives utility 
from consuming her own products, see id. at 2.  For example, several consultants I know personally 
indicated that they became consultants because they wanted a discount on certain beauty products and 
clothing.  However, if this were the case for all — or the majority of — consultants, then MLM companies 
would simply be termed “buyer’s clubs.”  See Keep, supra note 19, at 204. 
 71. See Coughlan, supra note 40, at 13.  The author notes that MLM companies could have low 
startup costs in order for potential consultants to try out the program and figure out whether they are low- 
or high-productivity type, id.  
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In addition, the prospective consultant might want to know how many 
consultants are in her networks.  For instance, if everyone in her community 
was already a consultant, then her expected profits might be lower as there 
are fewer available people to recruit.  She may also have prior beliefs about 
other consultants’ rationality, either viewing the other surrounding 
consultants as largely rational or largely irrational (i.e., overly optimistic 
about earning a profit).  If she believes the latter, then it seems possible that 
she plans to “ride a bubble” — making a profit from consultants she expects 
will fail.72  This plan, however, would likely constitute fraud and thus require 
the significant assumption that she is willing to defraud her targeted 
consultants.  
That said, these beliefs may differ throughout the levels of a MLM.  In 
particular, recruits that have recently joined may believe that other 
consultants are largely rational.  After all, longtime consultants appear to be 
making money, they themselves are likely to believe that their own decision 
to join was rational,73 and they must have some belief in the success of the 
consultants they recruit.  (In legal MLMs, the portion of commissions and 
bonuses increase based on the number of individuals you recruit, but, the 
MLM cannot directly pay a consultant for recruiting new individuals.)74  The 
MLM’s marketing reinforces these beliefs.75  At higher levels of a MLM, 
consultants may be more likely to believe that others are irrational, as they 
may have witnessed greater amounts of turnover or are more likely to 
recognize that at least some of their consultants will fail. 
Compounding confusion, MLM companies appear resistant to providing 
additional information to customers or regulators about the industry.  In 
2006, the FTC attempted to establish the business opportunity rule, which 
appeared to be a response to pyramid schemes’ exception from enforcement 
under the franchise rule.76  For a company that solicited potential consultants, 
 
 72. See BAR-GILL, supra note 32, at 153 n. 84; Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles 
and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA 173, 174–175 (2003). 
 73. I.e., a post-hoc justification. 
 74. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Pyramid Schemes: International Monetary Funds Seminar 
on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks (May 13, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-state 
ments/1998/05/pyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/W9E5-GL9J].  
 75. In Part III, I discuss how the idea of grit might double-down on consultants’ beliefs on others’ 
rationality — examples of failure are seen as lack of work ethic, not as bounded rationality revealed.  
 76. Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 19054 (proposed Apr. 12, 2006) (to be codified 16 
C.F.R. pt. 437).  Until the business opportunity rule was later implemented in 2012, MLMs could, in 
theory, have been forced to comply with the franchise rule, which states that businesses must provide 
material information to potential purchases (here, consultants) to provide them with an informed decision; 
this information includes “a statistical analysis of existing outlets of the business; whether company-
owned or franchised.”  Pareja, supra note 19 at 92.  However, MLM models often fell within the 
exceptions to the franchise rule, as the franchise rule has exceptions for business opportunities that do 
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required some form of consideration, and offered to “buy back … any or all 
of the goods or services[,]”77 the rule would have required the provision of a 
disclosure document to the prospective consultant.78  That disclosure would 
include “information about the seller; the business background of the seller’s 
principals and their litigation and bankruptcy histories; [and] the terms and 
conditions of the offer.”79  It would also require “statistical analyses of 
existing franchised and company-owned outlets.”80 
To simplify the process, the disclosure was to be limited to one page.81  
Moreover, the company would be asked to simply check “yes” or “no” to 
whether it had made an earnings claim,82 “been the subject of any civil or 
criminal action for misrepresentation,”83 or offered a cancellation policy.84  
If a company checked yes to any of these questions, it would have to attach 
additional information about the claims, legal actions, or cancellation 
policy.85  These requirements and the design of the form itself could be 
interpreted as incorporating aspects of behavioral economics, with an eye 
towards how individuals might interpret large amounts of complex 
information.86 
During the notice and comment period, however, the FTC received 
thousands of form letters from MLM consultants.87  Given the Amway 
Safeguards’ implication that legal MLMs should buy back their consultants’ 
unsold inventory,88 the Business Opportunity Rule’s inclusion of companies 
that “buy back goods or services” appeared to bring all MLM companies 
under the umbrella of the Rule.89  In 2008, the FTC chose to exclude MLMs 
from regulation by the Rule and to eliminate questions regarding legal 
actions against a company’s employees.90 
 
not, require immediate upfront costs of more than $500, or if the costs relate to wholesale selling, training 
or returnable invento, see ibid.  For instance, if registration fees were set at $499, the franchise rule would 
not apply.  
 77. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 19062. 
 78. Pareja, supra note 19, at 108–09. 
 79. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 19055. 
 80. Ibid. 
 81. Id. at 19091. 
 82. Id. at 19058. 
 83. Or whether its affiliates had been the subject of legal action.  Id. at 19088. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. However, the disclosures could be written in a way to be confusing.  Part IV briefly discusses 
the shortcomings of this approach. 
 87. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 76816, 76818 n.21 (Dec. 8, 2011) 
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). 
 88. See In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618, 669 (1979). 
 89. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76831. 
 90. See id. at 76819. 
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As scholars anticipated,91 it appears that industry lobbyists were part of 
this successful protest against extending enforcement under the Rule to 
MLMs.92  But the fact that short sellers in 2006 were prepared to sell stock 
from publicly held MLMs93 suggests that experts might believe that 
disclosure of further information would hurt revenue, and in turn, consultant 
entry into the market, as well as earnings per consultant (given that product 
sales depend wholly on consultants).  To better understand such beliefs and 
how disclosure policies like the proposed FTC rule would affect MLMs, a 
behavioral economics perspective provides a fruitful lens.  Even if MLMs 
provided further information to prospective consultants, they are likely to do 
so in a way that shapes the preferences of the prospective consultant, 
especially with regard to how the prospect perceives the information (what I 
term imperfect disclosure).  Additionally, the MLMs may exploit similar 
biases through a potential consultant’s desire to conform to a particular 
religious or gender identity. 
 
III.  A BEHAVIORAL MODEL 
 
In the following two sections, I look at how MLM disclosures to 
consultants exploit the consultants’ underlying behavioral biases, as well as 
how MLMs target consultants’ identities to exploit those same biases. 
 
A. IMPERFECT DISCLOSURE  
 
In this section, I define “imperfect disclosure” as the combination of (1) 
design choices by a MLM to influence prospective consultants into joining 
and (2) the cognitive biases that consumers might demonstrate in the process.  
Specifically, I suggest that at recruitment, MLMs strategically deploy design 
choices that appeal to emotion and engage in base-rate neglect (i.e., 
overreliance on successful but unlikely examples),94 altogether appealing to 
“present bias,” i.e., the behavioral economics concept that individuals 
strongly prefer rewards in the present.95  Recall again the prominently 
displayed quote from an ACN consultant: “I try never to think of what I will 
 
 91. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 107.  
 92. See Herb Greenberg, How Multi-Level Marketers Dodged a Bullet, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2013, 4:25 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100360456 [https://perma.cc/WP8K-WWMG]. 
 93. See Charles Duhigg, Why Short Sellers Want to Crash the Tupperware Party, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 2006, at C1. 
 94. See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–1125 (1974). 
 95. See generally, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 
443–477 (1997). 
3_LIU_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  12:16 PM 
2018 MULTILEVEL MARKETING 123 
 
do next week or next month, but always today.  That has always helped me 
get closer to my long-term goals.”96  After a prospective consultant signs a 
contract with the MLM company, the inertia bias and projected bias ensure 
her continued participation. 
 
1. During Recruitment 
 
A potential consultant may be recruited in multiple ways, including 
either through a friend who seeks to offer a new opportunity or through cold-
call advertising.97  It appears — likely due to the in-person nature of MLM 
— that generally, printed information is vaguely written on MLM websites.98  
For instance, on the ACN website, if you do not wish to sign the New 
Business Owner Agreement immediately, you are asked for your email and 
phone contact information so that a consultant may contact you.99 
MLM company events, with an ambiance similar to religious revivals, 
are a large part of recruiting.100  These events play on the likelihood that 
people are often more present biased in highly charged situations101 due to 
cognitive overload.102  In particular, the emotional intensity of the event may 
heighten prospective consultants’ propensity to invest in a MLM.  
At these company events, extremely successful consultants are brought 
on stage to discuss their experience with the company as a real-life parallel 
to testimonials found online.  The focus on in-person testimonials of this sort 
is an example of base-rate neglect — when individuals focus on specific 
incidents rather than average, baseline data103 — as enabled by the company.  
That is, only the most successful outcomes are shown and almost no 
information is distributed regarding the average or distribution of salaries.   
Large samples of data seem to be specifically, not randomly, selected:  
During litigation, Herbalife reported gross earnings from a subset of 
“eligible” distributors, but did not disclose the eligibility requirements.104  A 
full distribution of salary data, of course, would provide more valuable (and 
possibly different) information: One empirical study finds that “the bottom 
 
 96. ACN, supra note 7. 
 97. See Daniels, supra note 43, at 550. 
 98. See, e.g., LULAROE, supra note 17; CABI, supra note 38. 
 99. ACN, supra note 3. 
 100. I.e., music, professional lighting and motivational speakers.  See, e.g., ACN, supra note 1.  
 101. See generally David DeSteno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of Emotion-
Induced Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 43–56 (2004). 
 102. See generally ELDAR SHAFIR AND SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO 
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (Times Books 2013). 
 103. See generally Tversky, supra note 94. 
 104. See Keep, supra note 19, at 204.  
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99% of all Arbonne distributors earned an average income of $87.36 
annually whereas the top .04% earned an average income of $330,516.”105  
Moreover, “99% of all sales representatives in [a sample of ten MLMs] . . . 
earned less than $14 a week (on average) in commissions (from downline) 
while also earning less than ten dollars a week from their own sales.”106  As 
one scholar notes: 
 
[E]ven in the worst of the chain selling schemes…one can 
find participants who are making a lot of money at or near 
the top of their respective pyramids.  The problem is not 
that the company misstates such a person's income. The 
problem is the company's intentional omissions and 
implications suggest that such an income is typical and 
attainable.107 
 
When the true distribution of statistics is referenced, representatives from a 
MLM may note that “[a]ny industry offering such substantial rewards and 
carrying with it such a low dollar cost of entry will obviously tend to attract 
some of the best and some of the worst entrepreneurs.”108  Despite the sunny 
representations MLMs make to prospective clients, such push-back 
incidentally suggests that the true distribution suffers from selection bias or, 
alternatively, those consultants with lower incomes are working part time or 
not hard enough.109  
When numbers are cited by MLMs in their promotional materials, they 
relate to sales, not the probability of those sales or per capita sales.  For 
example, one MLM informed its prospective consultants that “if they 
 
 105. Tiffany Lamoreaux, Home is where the Work is: Women, Direct Sales, and Technologies of 
Gender (Apr. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with the Arizona 
State University Digital Repository)  
 106. Id. at 190. 
 107. Pareja, supra note 19, at 96. 
 108. Jeffrey A. Babener, Network Marketing and the Law, 24 VA. B. A. NEWS J. 12, 12 (1998).  
 109. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 198.  See, e.g., WILBUR CROSS, AMWAY: THE TRUE STORY OF 
THE COMPANY THAT TRANSFORMED THE LIVES OF MILLIONS xv (Berkeley Pub. Corp. 1999), provides a 
history of the company:  “[I]t was clearly recorded, in surveys of the demographics of salespersons, that 
99.9 percent were independent contractors rather than employees.”  One apt analogy to the MLM industry 
might be fantasy sports, where only a few participants win large payouts at the expense of the pool, even 
though the sites appear to market fantasy sports as games that do not necessarily require experience.  See 
N. Cameron Leishman, Daily Fantasy Sports as Game of Chance: Distinction Without a Meaningful 
Difference?, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1043, 1055 (2016); N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. 
Schneiderman Announces $12 Million Settlement With Draftkings And Fanduel (Oct. 25, 2016), https:// 
ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-12-million-settlement-draftkings-and-fanduel [http 
s://perma.cc/2HVZ-ENVM]. 
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‘market[ed] just five memberships per week, [they would] receive $500 per 
week!’ [yet] very few representatives . . . consistently sold five memberships 
a week” at that particular MLM.110  
Overall, the recruitment methods of MLM firms engender optimism, 
rationally so — the theoretical economic model mentioned in Part II suggests 
that a consultant will only bear a loss where she thinks she would be a high 
performer but is actually a low performer.  By highlighting only extremely 
successful examples and emphasizing that consultant effort necessarily leads 
to success,111 the MLM company perpetuates this optimism without 
providing any information that might help the consultant determine her 
future performance.  
While it should be expected that a profit-maximizing MLM would desire 
to highlight only success stories, in addition to highlighting benefits, at least 
some MLM companies ignore mentioning costs.112  The omission of costs 
furthers present bias and hampers the consumer’s ability to make a rational 
cost-benefit calculation. 
Ignorance of costs takes several hidden forms.  First, it may mean not 
mentioning costs in the distribution of salaries.  In Herbalife’s disclosure of 
consumer earnings, no consultant costs appear to have been mentioned — 
just gross revenue.113 
Second, “from signing up to remaining active, direct selling may come 
with more costs than consultants realize.”114  MLM companies often stress 
that “direct selling requires no special training or skill, [with] ‘low’ start-up 
costs,”115 appealing to lower-income or otherwise frugal prospects.  
However, even if a company does not require inventory to be purchased, they 
may stress the purchase of “demonstration kits” (e.g., catalogs, sample 
products) to enhance one’s selling business.116  Frequently-updated 
demonstration kits obscure later-occurring costs,117 potentially holding less 
saliency to prospective consultants.118  Other fees may be mandatory but only 
noted in the boilerplate: At ACN, if a consultant does not request quickly 
enough that her sales revenue be sent to her, she may be charged an Account 
 
 110. Duhigg, supra note 93. 
 111. In the following Part, I argue that the MLM industry’s emphasis on grit makes it possible to 
assume high incomes are attainable. 
 112. See Vander Nat, supra note 35, at 141. 
 113. See Keep, supra note 19, at 204. 
 114. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 184. 
 115. Id. at 183. 
 116. The MLM may require you to sign a claim that demonstration kits are not required.  See e.g., 
ACN, supra note 3. 
 117. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 183–184; see also O’Donnell, supra note 26. 
 118. See BAR-GILL, supra note 32, at 93. 
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Maintenance Fee to access where her revenue is stored.119  Legal disclaimers 
that indicate potential economic losses may also take the form of easily 
skimmed-over boilerplate language.120  Even after the recruiting event, 
consultants are asked to “certify that no claims of guaranteed profits or 
representations of expected earnings that might result from [their] efforts as 
an IBO have been made by [the MLM] or [the] sponsor.”121 
Finally, while the Amway Safeguards were meant to protect potential 
consultants, it may provide a sense of false security to a MLM’s business 
soundness.  Recall that the Amway test suggests that a MLM company was 
not unlawful if it provides performance bonuses conditional on a certain 
amount of sales to a certain number of customers,122 and provides an 
opportunity for consultants to sell back inventory with a penalty.123  
However, corporations are allowed to buy back their inventory at a discount 
— a penalty or cost that is not highlighted in the recruitment materials.124  
Additionally, it is unclear who enforces the underlying conditions for 
bonuses, such that consultants may occasionally purchase their own 
inventory to maintain their discount or bonus levels.125  Note that even if the 
consultant feels like this is forward-thinking behavior (i.e., contrary to 
present bias), she is likely overoptimistic about her prospects. 
 
2. At Signing of the Agreement 
 
Even if the MLM provides relevant information, it will be difficult to 
find.  This is especially amplified in the agreements signed between 
consultants and MLMs, where the design of the contract may cause 
confusion.  For example, take ACN’s Independent Business Owner 
Agreement, which asks the user to affirm that she “ha[s] read and agreed to 
be bound by all of the Terms and Conditions” of several agreements.126  The 
 
 119. See ACN, supra note 3. 
 120. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 96.  See also Daniels, supra note 43, at 548: “[I]t is not the act of 
recruitment which makes pyramid schemes suspect but the method of recruiting through unrealistic 
promises and mandatory investment.” 
 121. ACN, supra note 3. 
 122. I.e., by requiring that a consultant must sell 70% of her inventory to 10 different customers each 
month in order to receive a performance bonus.  See In re Amway Corp., Inc., et al., 93 F.T.C. 618, 668 
(1979). 
 123. See ibid. 
 124. ACN, for instance, buys back unsold inventory at 90% of the cost to the consultant.  ACN, 
supra note 3. 
 125. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 184. 
 126. ACN, supra note 3.  
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referenced materials, however, appear to be only viewable after the potential 
consultant has signed the agreement online.127 
While the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule now requires a cooling-off 
period — the opportunity to have seven business days to renege on a signed 
consultant contract128 — for prospective consultants, recent research 
suggests that cooling-off periods may actually entrench consultants or other 
decision-makers in their decision.129  For example, prospective consultants 
may fail to foresee how their lives may change with the time and money a 
MLM requires due to projection bias.130  In some ways, people may have 
already thought ahead and envisioned their status as a successful consultant, 
such that revoking the contract may seem like a loss or a sunk cost of time.131 
Finally, even if a consultant says that they plan to stay in the MLM 
industry for a certain amount of time or until they make a certain amount of 
revenue, their projection bias may not account for the fact that their attitudes 
towards the MLM industry may change, just as those attitudes may have 
already changed in the recruiting process.132  Coupled with the planning 
fallacy, in which people are prone to underestimate how much time their 
goals might take,133 a consultant might spend longer in an MLM than they 
had originally planned. 
 
B. PROMISES OF IDENTITY ENHANCEMENT. 
 
Another practice of MLMs is to emphasize how the company may 
enhance a consultant’s identity.  For example, the official ACN website 
displays the following from a testimonial: “It’s often said that ACN is a 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76859.  
 129. See Sven Hoeppner, The Unintended Consequence of Doorstep Consumer Protection: Surprise, 
Reciprocation, and Consistency, 38 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 247, 255 (2014) (citing George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209, 
1209–1248 (2003)). 
 130. See generally, e.g., Meghan R. Busse et al., The Psychological Effect of Weather on Car 
Purchases, 130 Q. J. ECON. 371, 371–414 (where car purchases are highly sensitive to weather suggesting 
that people are not properly anticipating the future). 
 131. See Courtenay Atwell, The Franchisee as a Consumer: Determining the Optimal Duration of 
Pre-Contractual Disclosure, 38 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 457, 482 (2015). 
 132. See generally George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in 
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209, 1209–1248 (2003); Busse et al., supra note 130. 
 133. See generally, e.g., Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin & Michael Ross, Exploring the “Planning 
Fallacy”: Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 366, 366–81 (1994). 
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personal development program with a compensation plan attached[.]”134  In 
doing so, MLMs play up the relative salience and benefits of non-financial 
considerations.135 
In particular, MLMs offer a narrative linked to American civil religion 
— the sociological proposition that nonsectarian religious symbols are often 
connected to American-exceptionalism values,136 including “boundless faith 
in the [potential] of economic growth and prosperity.”137  In MLM recruiting 
materials, both subtle and overt religious tones are often used, e.g., the word 
“blessing” is used frequently with regard to profits.138  In an example of these 
overtones, the history of Amway starts with the following: “In this book you 
will find the same insights . . . that have served as a guiding light and a 
resource for millions of people around the earth to create a more rewarding 
life.”139  Indeed, recruitment methods for at least some MLMs have often 
been compared to recruitment into religious organizations.140 
Altogether, the belief linked to American civil religion that “[b]oth God 
and the market should be left free . . . to reward correct behavior and punish 
the evil or lazy”141 plays into the mythology of the self-made man142 and can 
be translated into two mythical values removed from actual religious belief 
but tied to identity: (1) Grit (the idea that outcome is perfectly correlated with 
effort) and (2) independence.  The first value sustains MLM consultants’ 
optimism in the face of potential losses, while the second value reduces the 
focus on economic losses altogether.  
 
 134. Danny Volonino, http://acninc.com/news/company/2011/11/07/acn-and-personal-developm 
ent-danny-volonino-svp (last visited Mar. 21, 2018) (Note that I also saw this on the ACN website’s 
header with the same attribution; however, the website rotates through a series of quotes.); ACN, supra 
note 1. 
 135. See Keep, supra note 19, at 202. 
 136. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 134 DAEDALUS 40, 42 (2005); see generally 
KATE BOWLER, BLESSED: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PROSPERITY GOSPEL (2013).  
 137. Dick Anthony & Thomas Robbins, Spiritual Innovation and the Crisis of American Civil 
Religion, 111 DAEDALUS 215, 216 (1982). 
 138. See Epstein, supra note 44, at 98 (citing Pareja, supra note 19, at 119–20). 
 139. CROSS, supra note 109, at ix. 
 140. See generally Patralekha Bhattacharya & Krishna Kumar Mehta, Socialization in Network 
Marketing Organizations: Is it Cult Behavior?, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361, 361–74 (2000). 
 141. Simon M. Coleman, America Loves Sweden, Prosperity Theology and the Globalization of Civil 
Religion, in RELIGION AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF CAPITALISM: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
(Richard H. Roberts ed., 1995). 
 142. Also known as the rags-to-riches tale; see generally Seymour Martin Lipset, American 
Exceptionalism Reaffirmed, 2 INT’L REV. SOC. 256 (1988).  
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In the social psychological literature, situations that emphasize particular 
identities (i.e., priming) may cause behavior changes among individuals.143  
As such, one could imagine a situation in which situations that stress 
particularly religious or gendered themes alongside MLM opportunities may 
cause potential consultants to engage further with MLMs.  These contexts 
would serve as a social norm or reference point for what the consultant 
“should” do. 
In turn, these norms might lead to a consultant staying on with her MLM 
even when she is losing money for three reasons.  First, consultants who 
leave MLMs may not necessarily have plans for the next steps — MLM is a 
default path, and the people they work with have clear instructions for how 
to sell products.  The logistical difficulty of starting something new creates 
inertia that ultimately keeps the consultant from exiting the MLM.  Second, 
given that the majority of individuals are loss-averse, the consultant may 
want to continue working until she breaks even.  The consultant may exhibit 
the sunk-cost fallacy here — if she believes that she has already put too much 
time in this endeavor to fail.  Third, there is evidence that violating 
prescribed stereotypes about, for example, being American or female may 
result in social sanctions by others.144  The consultant may not only view her 
work as a failure, but also herself.145  MLMs’ emphasis on grit and 
independence may compound all of these beliefs. 
 
1. Grit 
 
Consider Amway, which one author described as “the most thoroughly 
American business in America . . . [i]n conception, in design, in basic 
economic philosophy, even in its very name itself.”146  That same author 
describes one of Amway’s values as follows: “If people are to be held 
accountable, then it is necessary that their performances be evaluated and 
 
 143. See generally Daniel Benjamin, James Choi & Joshua Strickland, Social Identity and 
Preferences, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1913, 1913–1928 (2010); Carol Dweck & Ellen Leggett, A Social-
Cognitive Approach to Motivation and Personality, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 256, 256–73 (1988). 
 144. See generally, e.g., Alice Eagly & Steven Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward 
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 573–598 (2002); Alice Eagly & Mary Kite, Are Stereotypes of 
Nationalities Applied to Both Women and Men?, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 451, 451–62 
(1987). 
  145. See generally Paul Davies, Steven Spencer & Claude Steele, Clearing the Air: Identity Safety 
Moderates the Effects of Stereotype Threat on Women’s Leadership Aspirations, 88 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 276, 276–87 (2005) (showing that an individual’s confidence in her identity reduces the 
psychological effect of stereotype threat, i.e., behaving more consistently with a particular stereotype). 
 146. See CHARLES PAUL CONN, THE POSSIBLE DREAM: A CANDID LOOK AT AMWAY 103 (Fleming 
H. Revell Co. 1977). 
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susceptible to judgment and the resulting rewards or penalties.  People reap 
what they sow, and they must be taught in school, at home, on the job, and 
in all walks of life.”147  Amway appears to use Biblical imagery148 in this 
value to reinforce the belief that grit leads to success.  
This belief appears consistently across MLM companies, where “success 
is considered to be a consequence of skill and attitude.”149  Thus, consultants 
who are not currently experiencing success must have a positive attitude to 
obtain further success.150  In contrast, “self-doubt is a sign of weakness and 
failure.”151  Failed consultants are considered the unmotivated majority:  
“Many simply do not have the stick-to-it attitude that characterizes the 
successful Amway distributor.”152  Yet, in one survey study of MLM 
consultants, job satisfaction was positively correlated with organizational 
commitment153 but negatively correlated with job performance,154 perhaps 
suggesting that optimism not only masks economic losses but may also 
prevent consultants from taking corrective steps earlier.  Even the disclaimer 
ACN uses regarding potential economic loss emphasizes effort: “Success as 
an ACN Representative is not guaranteed, but rather influenced by an 
individual's specific efforts.  Not all ACN Independent Representatives make 
a profit and no one can be guaranteed success as an ACN Independent 
Representative.”155 
Recruiters often stress that “in contrast to traditional corporate 
employment, direct selling is a meritocratic industry . . . .  [A]n individual’s 
race, class, age, and/or gender are meaningless in direct selling because 
success comes to those who simply work hard enough.”156  This attitude 
reinforces the optimism shown in the recruiting materials, discussed later.  
However, it is likely that lower-income consultants will have networks with 
less disposable income;157 MLMs ignore these structural realities.  
 
 147. CROSS, supra note 109, at 169. 
 148. See Galatians 6:7 (King James) (“[F]or whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.”) 
 149. Bone, supra note 42, at 116 (citing generally Peter Freund, Social Performances and their 
Discontents: The Biopsychosocial Aspects of Dramaturgical Stress, in EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL LIFE 268–
94 (G. Bendelow & S. Williams eds., 1988)); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (U.C. Press 1983)). 
 150. See Bone, supra note 42, at 116; see HOCHSCHILD, supra note 149. 
 151. Ibid. 
 152. CROSS, supra note 109, at 42. 
 153. See Pumela Msweli-Mbanga, Predicting Turnover Behaviour of Direct Salespeople, 8 S. AFR. 
BUS. REV. 14, 17 (2004).  
 154. See id. at 21.  
 155. ACN, supra note 3. 
 156. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 164–65. 
 157. See id. at 185. 
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Ultimately, the attitude of the disclaimer combines two biases:  The 
fundamental attribution error and optimism.  That is, a prospective 
consultant may view another consultant’s failure due not only to the 
consultant’s lack of talent but also due to their attitude — rather than the fact 
that the industry is relatively high risk.  Because the failure is due to 
something that appears controllable, the prospective consultant may believe 
that regardless of how risky MLMs are, she is better than the average 
consultant.  
Given that the attribution of success or failure falls squarely on 
consultants, it seems likely that unsuccessful consultants will engage the 
sunk cost fallacy.158  Some consultants, as mentioned earlier, may continue 
in their MLMs because they feel as if they have given too much to end on a 
losing note.  Alternatively, other consultants may engage with sunk costs in 
a novel — but still flawed — way.  That is, the optimism of these consultants 
allows them to (mistakenly) know that they will recoup their investment; they 
are not afraid of having already lost some money because they will gain it 
back. 
Even in the face of repeated failure, MLM consultants may find it 
difficult to remove themselves from MLMs altogether.  As one reporter 
whose mother was a consultant noted, “[t]his business was different from the 
others, my mother insisted, and as long as she “worked it like a business” 
she could succeed . . . .  It is hard to go to bat against a true believer.”159 
 
2. Independence 
 
MLM companies also attempt to recast notions of success, shifting it 
away from how much a consultant makes to how she can participate in the 
workplace.  MLM company origin stories often stress how they were 
founded as respectable, early 20th century alternatives160 to “dangerous and 
[un]glamorous…labor in the domestic, manufacturing, or agriculture 
industry.”161  In particular, this idea that certain types of work were not 
respectable enough appears to be particularly gendered, aligning with the 
ideas of “middle-class evangelical Christian femininity.”162  Specifically, 
 
 158. “Some women left because of the debt they acquired while others held on to the belief that if 
they worked hard enough they would eventually succeed.”  Id. at 188 (citing Virginia Sole-Smith, The 
Pink Pyramid Scheme, HARPER’S (July-Aug. 2009), 26–33).  
 159. Id. at 198. 
 160. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105 at 86. 
 161. Id. at 84.  This was true in some cases — some of the most successful MLMs created 
opportunities for black women.  See Kathy Peiss, “Vital Industry” and Women’s Ventures: 
Conceptualizing Gender in Twentieth Century Business History, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 218, 233 (1998). 
 162. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 12 (citing Beth Kreydatus, “Enriching Women’s Lives”: The 
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one sociologist found in her fieldwork that MLMs “deliberately tap into 
women’s anxieties and desires to blend their perceived gender roles with 
their need for income.”163 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the majority of MLM consultants are 
women.164  It appears that “the most important and repeated motivation for 
entering into direct sales . . . was the desire to be stay-at-home mothers — to 
have freedom”165 while still engaging in “meaningful employment . . . 
outside of waged labor.”166  To that end, MLM companies are compared 
positively to profit-making “traditional corporate avenues.”167  Recruiting 
materials may capitalize on gender stereotypes of women as “relationship 
oriented, caretakers, and socializers,”168 suggesting that women are naturally 
more gifted at MLM skillsets. 
Independence means many things to consultants — a flexible schedule, 
work-life balance, a way to provide goods and services that appear to align 
with their values,169 and, in turn, a way to exercise their beliefs in a secular 
workforce.170  But it also means a blurred boundary between work, home, 
and religion.  For consultants inexperienced with the workforce, this can lead 
to underestimation of costs, as they may not account for the fact that they 
may ask their children to help with packages and setup,171 document the 
purchases they themselves made as business expenses,172 or count the hours 
they have been working, particularly if their office is the home.  To that end, 
 
Mary Kay Approach to Beauty, Business, and Feminism,” BUS. & ECON. HIST. ON-LINE 3 (2005)).  See 
also id. at 95–100; see generally Katie Rose Sullivan and Helen Delaney, A femininity that ‘giveth and 
taketh away’: \The prosperity gospel and postfeminism in the neoliberal economy, HUM. RELATIONS 1–
24 (2016). 
 163. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 44. 
 164. But note that “men represent a majority of the executive leadership of the direct selling  
industry . . . and within direct selling affiliate [umbrella] organizations.”  Id. at 162. 
 165. Id. at 102. 
 166. Ibid. 
 167. John R. Sparks & Joseph A. Schenk, Explaining the Effects of Transformational Leadership: 
An Investigation of the Effects of Higher-Order Motives in Multilevel Marketing Organizations, 22 J. 
ORG. BEHAV. 849, 852 (2001). 
 168. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 129; see also Pei-Chia Lan, Networking Capitalism: Network 
Construction and Control Effects In Direct Selling, 43 SOC. Q. 165–184 (2002). 
 169. Sparks & Schenk, supra note 167 at 852, provide some potential justifications: “[E]ducational 
toys advance the cause of children; weight management programmes enhance self-confidence.”  To some 
extent, the blurring of religion and business is an encouragement to consultants: In one study, “being able 
to bring business together with private beliefs encouraged [a participant’s] recruitment” into a MLM 
business.  Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 97. 
 170. Busher, supra note 14, at 12.  See also Cheris Shun-Ching Chan, Reenchantment of the 
Workplace: The Interplay of Religiosity and Rationality, 45 BERKELEY J. SOC. 42, 52–58 (2001).  
 171. See Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 105–106 (finding that MLM consultants users view their 
office as home and vice versa).  
 172. See Vander Nat, supra note 35, at 141. 
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the blurred boundary “provides an effective means of exerting control over 
and eliciting affiliation from distributors.”173  The consultant will be more 
committed to the organization174 because of its mental association with her 
family. 
Social interactions and social media also amplify the myth of 
independence.  “The act of selling is transformed into an imaginary featuring 
making new friends, having fun, and caring about other people.”175  Thus, 
the choice to enter a MLM feels less like an economic necessity and more of 
a choice.176  At the same time, “MLMs establish elaborate systems of support 
through which members receive guidance and leadership from each 
other,”177 as can be seen through numerous Facebook groups and teams of 
MLM sellers that advertise each other’s sales.178  Moreover, successful 
consultants encourage others to “[t]rust the leadership and be coachable.  If 
you want what successful people have, just do what successful people do.”179  
That is, consultants must still rely on the company to maintain their grit. 
Finally, the benefits of independent employment leave the consultant 
with few tangible entitlements from their MLM.  Unlike traditional full-time 
work, consultants do not receive health or retirement benefits.180  Although 
some scholars argue that MLMs might personally empower low-income 
consumers,181 they may also render them ineligible for safety net 
provisions.182  Consultants must sign independent contractor agreements 
with indemnification and mandatory arbitration clauses.183  Further, they are 
asked not to represent their relationship with the MLM company as more 
 
 173. Busher, supra note 14, at 12. 
 174. See generally Michael G. Pratt & José Antonio Rosa, Transforming Work-Family Conflict into 
Commitment in Network Marketing Organizations, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 395 (2003). 
 175. Lamoreaux, supra note 105, at 129. 
 176. Indeed, social satisfaction is suggested as a reason for a prospective consultant to participate in 
MLM.  See Bhattacharya, supra note 140, at 369.  However, it appears that excessive MLM activity by 
consultants may cause friendships to actually weaken, as people become irritated by solicitations.  See 
Kent Grayson, Friendship Versus Business in Marketing Relationships, 71 J. Marketing 121, 132 (2007). 
 177. Sparks, supra note 169, at 851. 
 178. See, e.g., Lula Roe Down, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/lula.roedown/ 
[https://perma.cc/N33B-RN8T] (a website where clothes are sold by groups of consultants).  
 179. Spencer & Leanna Hunn — Enjoying the Fruits of Their Labor, ACN (Apr. 15, 2017), http:// 
theacnopportunity.shenellwhyte.com/acntelecomcanadamlm/acn-spencer-leanna-hunn.html [https://per 
ma.cc/9C3Z-Z2XC].  
 180. See Busher, supra note 14, at 18. 
 181. See id. at 19. 
 182. See id. at 18. 
 183. See ACN, supra note 3. 
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significant than it is184 — even as ACN displays a blog post titled “10 
Reasons Why ACN Can Change Your Life.”185 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this discussion of MLMs, I have noted several suggested policies, 
each with potentially mixed results or unanticipated consequences.  First, 
cooling-off periods might allow time for consumers to justify their 
involvement in an MLM rather than question it.  Second, other actions that 
are meant to lower costs once people join — for example, lowering upfront 
fees so that people can “try out”  the MLM, or a more lenient buy-back policy 
so that customers are not stuck with inventory186 — will not necessarily 
correct for consultants’ optimism, especially if the belief that grit is perfectly 
correlated with success is persistent.  Moreover, these relatively generous 
policies might, like the Amway safeguards, make prospective consultants 
feel overly secure with their financial prospects.  Third, regulating what and 
how information about a MLM is disclosed to consumers has proven 
somewhat politically unfeasible at the federal level,187 especially given the 
ties between the MLM industry and the current administration.188  When the 
final version of the Business Opportunity Rule was distributed in 2011, the 
FTC reiterated its stance, stating that it would be difficult for MLMs to craft 
an earnings disclosure given the heterogeneity of consultants (i.e., some 
work part time, some full time, and others intermittently), such that 
“disclosure would not provide prospective MLM participants with an 
accurate account of the MLM experience or with information necessary to 
make an informed purchasing decision.”189 
That said, simplifying disclosure has been done in other fields.  It might 
be more politically feasible to pass enhanced consumer protection and 
disclosure laws at the state level.  One could imagine, for example, a 
standardized handout (or website) accompanying each MLM that showed 
 
 184. See id.  The relevant clause in the ACN Independent Business Owner Agreement states, “I agree 
to make no false or misleading statements regarding the ACN Products or about the various relationships 
between ACN, the ACN Provider(s) and me.” 
 185. Tracy Tippetts, 10 Reasons Why ACN Can Change Your Life, ACN (Apr. 17, 2013), http:// 
acninc.co-m/news/company/2013/04/17/whyacn [https://perma.cc/N7W8-3TGH]. 
 186. Coughlan, supra note 40, at 13; Daryl Koehn, Ethical Issues Connected with Multilevel 
Marketing Schemes, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 153, 156 (2001). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II. 
 188. In addition to the president’s endorsements of ACN, the current Secretary of Education, Betsy 
DeVos, is married to the son of Amway’s founder.  Noam Scheiber, Betsy DeVos, Trump’s Education 
Pick, Plays Hardball with Her Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2017, at A1.  
 189. FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76823.  
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the average revenue, costs and hours worked, both nationally and in the 
metro area of the prospective consultant.  At least one private-sector website 
has already attempted to provide standardized venues in which MLMs could 
be compared against one another; while the design is simple, the website 
uses metrics such as “expected payout after selling $1,000” and “startup kit 
price.”190  As mentioned previously, however, these metrics do not address 
the issues of how likely it is for a consultant to sell $1,000 of product or the 
fact that a low startup kit price may make hidden fees less salient.191  Even 
if relevant information is provided to consumers, it may still be framed with 
an eye towards behavioral biases.192  The common shortcoming of these 
consumer-facing interventions is that they might create a cat-and-mouse 
game between marketers and regulators,193 where marketers attempt to 
discover and exploit other behavioral biases.  Nonetheless, it is not clear 
which behavioral interventions might succeed.  Future research in the field 
should test these areas. 
Even if regulating information disclosure to consumers does not 
necessarily change their behavior, due to the cat-and-mouse game, it is still 
important for MLMs to release more data on earnings and costs.  In the same 
way the EEOC collects employee demographic and salary data, for 
example,194 the FTC could collect MLM data for preliminary analysis and 
potential enforcement.195  MLM companies might argue that they are so 
decentralized that it would be nearly impossible to aggregate this 
information, as they argued when the Business Opportunity Rule was being 
crafted, but that argument neglects the fact that costs and revenue data (in 
the form of inventory orders and sales data respectively) ultimately pass 
through their organizations.  Furthermore, even if MLM consultants are 
considered independent contractors, the consulting agreements they sign 
require them to abide by the MLM’s policies.  As such, the MLM is not 
prevented from implementing a policy where consultants must log the hours 
 
 190. See, e.g., CareerTrends, HERBALIFE, http://work-at-home.careertrends.com/l/48/Herbalife (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
 191. See supra Part III. 
 192. See, e.g., HERBALIFE, supra note 22, which does not clearly indicate that half of “active sellers” 
make no extra commission from Herbalife. 
 193. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1648–1649 (2014). 
 194. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 89; Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, EEOC to Collect Summary Pay Data (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news 
room/release/9-29-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/AXB5-A8M4]. 
 195. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 194; Heidi 
Liu, More Data, More Problems? Why the Proposed EEO-1 Data Collection is a Net Gain, ON LABOR 
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/04/12/more-data-more-problems-why-the-proposed-eeo-1-
data-collection-is-a-net-gain/ [https://perma.cc/QMN2-D9U7]. 
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they work.  Because this data would not necessarily be used towards 
disclosures to individual consultants, concerns about coarsely estimated 
earnings serving as “inaccurate accounts of the MLM experience”196 would 
be diminished. 
Another suggested point of intervention is to equip trade associations to 
ensure that their members are acting ethically, such that membership in the 
association is an accurate signal of quality.  There have been attempts to do 
this.  For instance, one commentator notes that “MLMs who have joined the 
Direct Selling Association [the most prominent lobbying group in the 
industry197], agree not to hide behind the ‘independent contractor’ status of 
their sales forces in an effort to avoid responsibility for what their sales force 
does.”198  Still, it is unclear how the Direct Selling Association has enforced 
this and what incentive the organization would have for restraining its 
members.  
In addition to studying the effects of potential behavioral interventions 
or regulations on MLM consultants, another important area of research is in 
the conditions under which MLMs (and potential interventions) exist.  
Changing these conditions could help make behavioral interventions 
efficacious and more specifically targeted.  For example, one group of 
researchers suggests three areas of research: (1) “[T]he relative value of 
tangible and intangible rewards associated with becoming a MLM 
distributor,”199 (2) the point when a distributor chooses to no longer 
participate, and (3) “the low level of complaints by victims of pyramid 
scheme fraud.” 200 
Differences among MLMs are also worth considering.  For instance, 
there are several different ways in which MLMs distribute bonuses amongst 
consultants.  These incentive structures may attract participants of different 
risk propensities, or shape risk propensities themselves.  Alternatively, it is 
possible that the participant is not aware of these differences.201  If some 
types of MLMs are more prone to unethical behavior than others, data from 
FTC settlements could help shed light on what types of MLMs undergo 
enforcement. 
 
 196. See FTC Business Opportunity Rule, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 76823; discussion supra  
Part II. 
 197. See FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 16110, 16114 (proposed Mar. 26, 2008) (to 
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). 
 198. Koehn, supra note 186, at 158. 
 199. Keep, supra note 19, at 205. 
 200. Ibid. 
 201. See Rod Nichols, Which Compensation Plan is the Best?, BETTERNETWORKER (Sept. 24, 2010, 
12:59 PM), http://www.betternetworker.com/articles/view/sponsoring-and-recruiting/dealing-objections 
/which-compensation-plan-best [https://perma.cc/NB7F-Y6ZP]. 
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Research on existing legal and policy differences across states may also 
be helpful.  For instance, various press articles seem to suggest that Utah is 
a hub for MLM incorporations due to a high level of trust in the 
community202 — although this has rarely been supported with empirical 
data.203  It seems possible that the identity norms articulated in Part III might 
dovetail with Utah’s population, which is both highly religious and has a 
relatively high proportion of women outside the traditional labor force.204  
Understanding the circumstances under which MLM-relevant policies form 
is important for understanding their potential consequences.  Ultimately, 
given the lack of information around the industry itself, the legal landscape 
MLMs reside in is ripe for further study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Pareja, supra note 19, at 88 n.30; Alice Hines, How Utah Became a Bizarre, Blissful 
Epicenter for Get-Rich-Quick Schemes, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 9, 2015), http://talkingpoint 
smemo.com/theslice/mormon-utah-valley-multilevel-marketing-thrive-doterra [https://perma.cc/8MLU-
HF8X]; Daryl Lindsey, Follow the Profit: How Mormon Culture Made Utah a Hotbed for Multi-Level 
Marketers, KUTV (Sept. 8, 2016), http://kutv.com/news/local/follow-the-profit-how-mormon-culture-
made-utah-a-hotbed-for-multi-level-marketers [https://perma.cc/P876-FZA4]. 
 204. See Lindsey, supra note 203. 
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